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It is t!:e contention oi this pE!pe:c

tirnt

the contemporary phenorc1Cil0tl of

economic backtMrdneoc i-efle:cts the r,erpctuc:tion :,i tcnclencics -:.1hich .:ire :.:ootcd
firmly in underlying historical patterns of development,

Underdevelopment can

thus be thought of as a dynamic historical process, in which the foci of analysis
of each historical period are a political economy and its characteristic mode of
production,

The underdevelopment of Thailand is the result of a prolonged

process of specialization, consequent upon exposure to the forces of world

trade, which led to a very specific pattern of resource allocation,

This pape~

develops an overview of the historical dimensions of this underdevelopment
which is intended to serve as an alternative to the existing treatment of
2
1
Thailand and of other backward economies,
The methodology of political economy treats the economy as part of a
larger social system in which social, political and economic forces are related
to each other in an organic way.

The historical approach is concerned with

explaining not merely the performance of national income as an aggregate but
the factors which shape the constituent element~
and determine the resultant distribution.

affect their dynamic path

It thus focuses on the patterns,

processes, and resultant structures of different stages of underdevelopment,
The character of a political economy reflects, primarily, the nature of
the productive apparatus and its method of solving the basic economic problems,
in particular the characteristic way in which the economic surplus is
appropriated.

Each historical period can be delineated by the dominant mode

of production and its accompanying, and interacting, organizational structu~e.
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The fundamental mechanism of control over the dynamic changes which occur
from one period to another are the forces which accompany the process of
capital accumulation and the productive and organizational relationships
linking capital and labor.

3

Underdevelopment will persist, it will be argued, if the mode of production
contains forces which prevent the diffusion of economic gains and if the result•
ant structures contains mechanisms which resist change: through the entrenchment
of an existing method of surplus appropriation, or the existence of powerful
beneficiaries who may oppose changes in an on-going mode of operation.

The

dynamic forces of capital accumulation may lead to gains in the income of small
sectors, or interest groups, which must be weighed against the costs of not
affecting the overall development of an economy, or of a people,

The Historical Determinants in Thailand: A Summary
The contemporary underdevelopment of Thailand is explicable only in terms
of its historical experience of which the principle features can be summarized
as follows:

1.

An exogeneous increase in the demand for primary agricultural commodlties

led to a fundamental change in the mode of production through specialization and
division of labor and these resulted in a specific form of resource allocation
in the domestic economy,

This change occured through the harnessing of pre

existing surplus capacity, and the extension of commercial agriculture permitted
a greatly enlarged surplus without significant changes in the techniques of
production.
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2.

The process of specializat ion into rice production destroyed a

complex pattern of subsistence agriculture, local handicrafts and manufacturi ng
activity.
3.

The form of appropriatio n of the economic surplus became that of a

transfer of agricultura l products from the hinterland to Bangkok.

In the

metropolis -satellite relationship which emerged, capital was largely in the
hands of an alien (Chinese) comprador-m erchant class and a European investment
class.
4.

The beneficiary classes included (i) foreign factors, who provided

labor, capital and entrepreneu rship for the export industries (both mineral and
agricultura l), the inflow of which gave rise to a small enclave of modern
manufacturi ng and the remittances from which form a further leakage from the
flow of domesticall y-generated savings; (ii) the comprador-m erchant class and a
class of "bureaucrat ic capitalists,

,.4 and (iii) a class of "luxury importers"

(a emergent bourgeoisie ) in the metropolis who diverted part of the surplus into
a demand for luxury goods from abroad.
5.

The accompanying organizatio n changes, which allowed this transfer

to take place more efficientl½ included: the provision of a limited infrastructu re
(a communicati ons system), an enlarged and reformed administrat ive bureaucracy
(both to supervise the transfer and to bring as much of the country as possible
under metropolita n control), and functional agencies (import-exp ort firms, trading
towns, and a distribution network).
6.

These changes contain mechanisms for exaggeratin g underdevelo pment:
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the dicotomy between the satellite and the metropolis became more apparent as
the new mode of operation of the economy enriched the capital and port (Bangkok)
through the surplus-transfe rence process.
7.

In addition, the absence of any significant linkages or feedbacks from

the extension of agricultural cultivation meant that they were few spread
effects resulting from -increased output, and the level of well-being remained
constant, or may have even declined due to the break-down of previous social
relationships.
8.

The relative distribution of income tended to worsen, and while 85 per

cent (or more) of the population remained on the land their income levels did
not raise aggregate demand for consumer goods to a level ·that permitted their
domestic manufacture.

Accumulated capital was used for trading purposes, real

estate, or luxury consumption and a very small percentage was converted i~to
manufacturing within Thailand itself.
9.

Thailand became a part of the world economy and of an international

division of labor.

As a supplier of primary agricultural commodities and importer

of consumer goods, self-sufficienc y was replaced by reliance upon the world
market, in particular upon trade with a restricted number of Western countries.
Threats to its territorial independence from the West forced it to act like a
colony and limited the possibilities of domestic development.
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The Main Historical Periods: A S1.µI1mary

Within this framework the main hist~rical periods, which are to be explored
at greater length below, can be summarized as follows:
(A)

Prior to the middle of the 19th century Thailand was a self-suffic ient

economy, based upon a loose village agricultura l structure with enough non
agricultura l production to supply necessary implements and household goods.
Capital was in the form of land and stored-up value of agricultura l products.
The most important mechanism was control over labor, rather than land (which
was in relatively abundant supply);

one.-third to one-half of the population

...

existed in a state of bondage and most of the remainder were subject to
onerous forced labor duties.

A small amount of capital was used for manufactur

ing of both primitive industrial and household goods and exports consisted as
much of these as of agricultura l products.

Under this system of "Oriental

Despotism 115 the entire economic surplus was appropriate d by the governing
class, though the agency of "bureaucrat ic capitalists , " and was used to serve
the national needs for defensive warfare; power and wealth were defined by
status relationship s centered around the king.
(B)

From the opening up of the country to trade with the West in the

middle of the 19th century, a new pattern of surplus appropriatio n came into
existence.

The primary feature was the extension of mercantile capital necessary

for the storing, transportat ion and processing of agricultura l produce, and an
important controlling device control was ownership of this capital.

Important

-6-

organizational changes accompanied this change in the mode of production;
new beneficiary classes emerged in the form of a new merchant class who trans
fered the surplus from the agricultural hinterland to Bangkok, and with the
entry of foreign factors of production.

The emergence of a wage labor class

was greatly accelerated.
(C)

Since 1945, despite gains in national income and a more diverse

pattern of economic activity, underdevelopment has persisted and the mode of
operation is reflected in the basically unchanged structure of the economy.
An increasingly lop-sided pattern of growth has left the agricultural sector
(over 80 per cent of the labor force) stagnant with low levels of income and
well-being.

Metropolis-centered development underscores the unequal distribution

of gains in income both regionally and interpersonally, Bangkok appears less
and less a part of Thailand,

External trade reflects a basically unchanged

pattern of primary exports and consumption goods imports while foreign aid
and international loans have consistently compensated for a deficit in the
balance of trade.

In spite of the enlarged manufacturing sector, employment

in the metropolis has increased very little, leading to a swelling of the
underemployed labor force

which

ts in

sharp contrast to the boom in

construction, commerce, real estate and other services which absorb large amounts
of the enlarged national surplus.

There are increasing tensions between apparent

attempts to diffuse development and the underlying forces of the political
economy which resist any changes in the fundamental direction of economic activity.
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II- The Pre-Trade Economy: Thailand Before the Bowring Treaty, 1855.

The Thai nation took shape through a number of separate kingdoms:
Sukhothai, Ayudhya, Bangkok.

The pattern which emerged from the Ayudhyan

dynasty (1448-1767), which established many of the essential features of modern
Thailand particularly in governmental organization, was a nation based on self
sufficient village life and composed of quasi-independent regions, whose
primary concern was defensive, and offensive, warfare.
The characteristic form of political organizational and mode of production
from the 15th to the 18th centuries was that of an "Oriental Despotism."

The

national bureaucracy created by King Trailok in 145~ the framework of which
survived almost intact into the 19th centur~ is

a

clear expression of the

political and organizational framework corresponding to the basic mode of
production.

All but a small part of the national surplus was appropriated

by the king and it was used both to sustain the ruling group and to ensure the
self-survival of the kingdom.

From 1488 to 1787 there was at least one notable

military undertaking every four years but although nation-holding was a
primary function, "the Thai king was not primarily a warrior, nor was his
essential a garrison state. 116

The bureaucratic structure arranged the provinces

around the central territory of the kingdom in four classes, according to their
stategic importance to the defense of the kingdom,

Each province was controlled

by ministers of the king's council and the basic functions of local government
7
were
to maintain peace and order; to collect
information on manpower, elephants, and

-8-

other resources; to mobilize military
conscripts upon request and use corvee
labor; to collect a share of the area's
wealth for provincial use and for trans
mission to the capital.
The bureaucracy, in addition to its functional signifigance, performed
a vital social role as the basic instrument for providing social order and
continuity-it thus served.as "the framework of the strata of society between
the king and the peasantry."
E,!,

8

Social relationships were defined by the sakdi

or dignity-mark system, whereby numbers designated the amount of land

over which a noble or commoner had nominal jurisdiction, indicating heirarchal
position in the society rather than actual control.
Since land was in relatively abundant supply, control over labor power
was the most critical feature of the system of authority.
society was a

At the base of the

landless laboring slave class, accounting for between one-

fourth to one third of the population. 9

In addition, an onerous system of

-~

corvee labor applied to commoners, ensuring a supply of labor to the nobility
and to the king for public works

10

or military service.

The economic base of the society was one of self-sufficient village life.
The Asiatic mode of production although it conveys a limited portrait of this
society, and of its dynamic changes, refers to the "self-sustaining unity
of manufacture and agriculture" which "contains all the conditions for repro•
duction and surplus production within itself. 1112

Originally a wandering

tribal people, sedentary cultivation became possible when the Thais settled
in the fertile river plains.

The communal system, based on tribal and kinship

11
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groups and an internal division of labor, in response to the differential
availability of land in relation to labor and the more complex needs of the
economy with growing population, gave way to a system based on the bondage of
the masses of the people,
From the 16th to the 19th centuries, economic activities were greatly
enlarged, producing a highly diverse economy with abundant local handicfafts
and household inqustries to provide for requirements in housing materials,
clothing, agricultural and domestic implements, through a wide range of
industries: metal pr9duction, tin mining and smelting, pottery and earthenware
manufacture, paper-making, sugar manufacture, iron works, cotton and silk
growing, weaving and spinning, shipbuilding, rice mills, saw mills and the
13
production of building materials such as tile, brick and lime,
Apart from the small pockets of capital accumulation which were devoted
to these non-agricultural production activities, the bulk of capital consisted
of land and stored-up agricultural produce.

The small amount of internal trade

was already a Chinese monopoly by 1850, 14 and a large part of it consisted of
tax payments flowing to Bangkok from the provinces. 15

Supplies of necessary

European and Asian products were obtained from abroad through shipping routes
between Bangkok, Penang, Malacca, Singapore and Canton. E!(ports included high
value products such as ivory, deerskins, metals and woods, as well as agricultural and some manufactured products.

16

A class of uwners of capital who acted as commercial or fiscal agents for
the state shared in the national surplus.

These "bureaucratic capitalists"
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included tax collectors, private businessmen and members of the bureaucracy
engaged in trade and industry.

The vast extension of mercantile activity

made possible by increased trade was the major dynamic force promot~ change
\

in the next ?istorical period,

\

'

There pas a deep-seated resistence to opening up the country to tra~e
with the W~st, both because of the long-standing royal monopoly of trade and
also

t:i:om

the awareness of the restrictions which this would place upon the

,.

kin~- and the possible threat to national sovereignty.

-trefties were signed

Before the first

however, from the turn of the 19th centurY,economic

/

c~anges were already putting pressure on the existing organizat:i,onal systb.
A new supply of labor in the form of immigrant Chinese became more attractive

than the cory£~ and wage labor became more common during the reign of Rama 11 ·
(1809-24).

Also tax-farming privileges were sold to willing Chine-sa._bidders,

enlarging the class of bureaucratic c~pitalist<J.In the reign of Rama III (1824-51)
this system, found more efficient as a way of guaranteeing royal revenues, was
extended to 38 objects of taxation.

The deeply entrenched pluralistic aspect

of underdevelopment in Thailand thus dates from the early 19th century when
the Chinese g.nined control of distribution and became an important beneficiary
class.
However the decision made by Rama IV to conceed to British and Ame~ican
pressures and commercial interests was a decision of !_ealpoliti~ characteristic
of Thai diplomacy, and suggestive of the real dangers which were felt from
British and French territorial ambitions.

17

The Bowring Treaty, 1855, granted

trading rights and extra-territorality to the British; and it was followed by
treaties with the
18
1870.

u.s.

and France in 1856 and with ten other European powers by
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III·

The Repercussions of Entry into the
World Economy, 1855-1938

The immediate and long-term effects of nominal political independence
from the West was a dramatic change in the mode of operation of the political
economy.

Specialization led to a vast expansion in commercialized agriculture,

19 · b
· dustr1es,
b tought a b out t h e dec line o f rura 1 1n
·
. 1
wit atten dant soc1a.L
implications, and brought into being new beneficiary classes.

The dynamic

of this process of reallocation of resources and redirection of activity
was the expansion of mercantile capital .in.... the agricultural sector, reflect-~
ing the enlarged importance of trading activities.

A necessary corollary

was the creation of a new infrastructure to administer to the needs of an
enlarged economy.
the ir~plications of this change were to make the country dependent upon
international trade, and to foreclose one alternative path of development by
eliminating the pockets of local capital accumulation, and the skills .1ssoci.;.it::,,~
with the traditional rural industries.

Against the gains from trade recognized

in traditional theory must be weighed the opportunity cost of the emergent
structure of underdevelopment, its economic and soc_ial costs and the limitation
of future options other than dependence on primary exportation and the importa
tion of foreign manufactures.
The figures for rice production and exporc from 1857 onwards reflected
the generation of an enormous agricultural surplus. 20

From the similarity f;:i

initial conditions, Thailand would appear to have started at

:·1:"oughly the

Sll::r!.·2
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level as Japan, although its subsequent development is strikingly different.
Since money incomes and per capita consumption appear to have risen very little
21
from 1865 to 1930,
indicating that the enlarged surplus was not retained
in the agricultural sector, the possibility existed of striking gains being
made by certain beneficiary groups in the society.
Specialization took the form of a reduction in Z goods 22

activity,

reallocation of activity towards increased crop production, and
23
·
o f consumption
·
d manu f actures.
towar d s importe

a

a

redirection

This specializatio'1 was
\

encouraged by the terms of trade which favored the rice farmer over the urban
wage-earner from the 1820's to about 1910.

24

Foreign competition caused the disappearance of most household indu.s,try,
for example, paper, pottery, shipbuilding, sugar industry and much of the
textile industry (although this showed an unusual resilience).

However some

new manufacturing was created, largely through the activities of Chinese middle
men, noteably inland boatbuilding, rice and saw mills and the brick, tile and
lime industries (for building materials).
Among the opportunity costs of this specialization process must be counted
the social costs of the disruption of primitive society.

A contemporary

observer, at the turn of the century, expressed it as follows:

25

The people, from a self-supporting primitive
community, have become large producers of
agricultural products for export, and consumers
of imported products of foreign industries .••
In consequence the principal primitive local
industries have died out •.. The economical
evolution has thus led to great alterations in
the whole social fabric of the country, by
changes in the system of production ensued
from it, and by the gradually increasing tendency
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for specialisation of work,,,This of course
is beneficial to foreign trade and industries,
but greatly detrimental to the people concerned.
A country of capitalists would be able to stand
such conditions; but in primitive countries
supplanting of the products of local and domestic
industries easily may lead to economical and
social disturbances and financial difficulties,
if no compensation can be found in development
of production in other directions, .. Many people
have suffered and are still suffering from the
operation of the country being opened up in an
inconsiderate way.
There are a number of striking features regarding the development of
Thailand as an open export economy:
(1)

The smallness of the area affected and the general uneveness of

development meant that the impact of external demand was restricted to the
teak-producing regions of the north and a triangular area of the Central Plains.
(2)

The dominant mechanism of development was of a transfer of the export

able agricultural surplus from the hinterland to Bangkok, a process which gave
rise to the characteristic metropolis-satellite relationship, a feature of many
other underdeveloped countries. 27
(3)

The almost total absence of Thai participation in trade, commerce

and manufacturing; thus there was no tendency until very recently towards the
development of an indigeneous bourgeoisie, the social structure remained
characteristically one of rice farmers (over 90 per cent of the population) and
members of the government bureaucracy.
(4)

28

The natural implication was that the Chinese very early on formed

an alliance with the Thai ruling groups and took the initiative in all types
of non-agricultural activity.

But they did not transform the surplus over which

26
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they gained control into industrial forms.

This reflected a preference for

greater liquidity due to economic insecurity as aliens, and the remittance of
profits back to China.

The magnitude of this flow was put at around 1,250
million baht from 1890 to 1941, 29 The lack of transfer of the profits of
agricultural distribution, processing and exporting into industrial forms was
an important contraint on future development.
The profound changes which took place in the mode of operation of the
economy had their counterpart in the related changes in organizations and
I

institutions.

The national/milita ry structure or "system-mainten ance

bureaucracy, .,JO which had been adequate for a nation of quasi-independe nt
regions

ot

in ensuring the provision of sufficient resources for the maintenance

the court and defense of the kingdom, came under serious strains and gave

way to a much reformed apparatus,
The immediate impact of the treaties in the second half of the 19th
century was the loss of the king's control over state trading, taxes and the
revenues from customs duties on trade commodities.

The government encouraged

rice production by offering incentives to farmers to enlarge the area under
cuJtivation and by enacting liberal laws regarding unclaimed lands.
more, improvements in

Further

infrastructure (railways, irrigation, canals), and the

abolition of the corvee and slave labor, generated classes of peasant owners
and wage laborers in agriculture.

Export revenues from agricultural goods

became a main source of revenue for the Bangkok government.
The later part of the nineteenth century saw sweeping changes in the

--:
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organization of the government, both in response to the changed economic

circumstances and to the instability in foreign relations which threatened
loss of territory.

These changes were begun by King Mongkut and carried out

more fully by King Chualongkorn (1868-1910) who overhauled the existing
bureaucracy and attempted to convert it into a functionally effective, pro
ductive set of Western-style administrative agencies which would encompass
the vulnerable extremities of the kingdom.

He also reformed the fiscal system

to reduce the dependence on tax farming and the corruption of provincial
governors and officials, attempted vigorously to unite the kingdom by the
creation of postal and telegraph services, the continued expansion of commun
ications, completion of maps and surveys, and began the first public educational
system,

31

In spite of the persistent vulnerability of the kingdom, territorial
independence was preserved and the Thais maintained a continuity in their
governmental and political institutions which was unbroken from the beginning
of the Chakkri dynasty in 1767.

Their freedom from direct colonial rule

reflected their diplomatic skill but was also the outcome of an agreement
between the French and British to preserve a buffer stete between their respec
tive interests in Inda-China, Bunna and Malaya.
Nominal independence from the West imposed, however, serious costs on
the Thai government since it severly restricted its ability to pursue an in
dependent development policy,

From 1892 to 1941 only 11 per cent of the govern-

ment expenditures was spent on development, 32
· while the terms of the foreign
treaties effectively prevented the imposition by the government of any new
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direct ta~es.

33

Foreign influence was reflected in the conservativ e

monetary policy of maintaining 100 per cent reserves, and dependence on foreign
banks (a Central bank was not established until 1941).

British financial

advisors were prominent in all these decisions and the British exerted an
important influence over economic development :

JL,,

Approximate ly 70 per cent of thailand's
imports originated in Britain, and a
large part of her exports went to British
territories . British firms located in
Bangkok were prominent in this trade, two
or three of the principle banks were British
and British firms dominated the tin and teak
industries. Beginning in 1905 sterling
loans were sold chiefly in Britain.. ,The
principle aim of British policy was to main
tain order and stability, and to prevent any
thing from disturbing or endangering her trade
or investments ..• Some have said that Thailand
was a colony in all but name.
The maintenance of a buffer state in Thailand also made it unnecessary
for the British to incur any military expenditure s in order to protect Burma
35
and Malaya on the Thai borders.
tn summarizing the events of this phase of the post-trade economy the
focus of analysis has been to show how fundamental changes in the mode of
operation of the economy led to a deeply entrenched method of surplus
appropriatio n characterize d by extensions of mercantile capital, specializati on,
and trade dependence.

The decline of rural industries was not matched by the

development of manufacturin g, and the government was hampered in managing the
domestic economy by the de facto degree of foreign influence.

The subsequent

phase of Thailand's post-trade experience reflects very closely these historical
determinant s.
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IV.

The Repercussions of Trad.~: Some Further Analysis

The above descriptive changes can be amplified and supported by
reference to some existing theories and analytical devices.

This section

examines

11

the relevance of the concepts of "export economies,

the "staples

theory" and linkages, and the "tree-star structure" to the experience of
Thailand.

It will be seen that these represent only partial descriptions of

the underdevelopment problem.
The vent for surplus model emphasizes the expansion of agricultural
output for export utilizing surplus capacity and existing techniques of
production, which gives rise to an export-oriented economy without any re36
duction in domestic production.
This model depends on the assumption of
surplus labor in the pre-trade economy, it de-emphasizes the role of Z goods,
or non-agricultural activities, but points to the "colonial" trade pattern
which emerges through export expansion and to its inadequacy as an engine of
growth.
A characteristic of export-oriented economies, as analy~ed by Levin, is
the presence of foreign factors of production in the export sector.

The

international mobility of these factors is in sharp contrast to the general
immobility of domestic factors; their inward flow gives rise to a class of
luxury importers and represents a leakage from domestic savings in the form
of remittances abroad.

37

For growth to occur outside the export sector there

must be sufficient demand to encourage it.

However, in this type of export

ec~nomy wealth becomes concentrated into the hands of luxury importers and
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foreign factors which results in a very small domestic market. 38

Manufactures

tend to be imported, not domestically produced.
The stimuli which are provided by primary production can be thought of
in terms of linkages, and these depend on the technological characteristics
of the primary commodity, and on whether the economy is an export enclave or
en open peasant economy. 39

An open export economy has distinctive features

which can be analyzed in terms of factor input coefficients, income distribution,
infrastructural requirements, linkages and other external benefits. 40

The

input coefficients for capital and skilled labor are lower in peasant agricul
ture than in an enclave economy, and fewer foreign factors are likely to be
imported; the needs for unskilled labor are higher and the lack of productivity
change limits the need for fixed capital, while increasing the need for
commercial capital,

The external training and skills induced by peasant

agriculture are likewise lower than in enclave developments, whereas infra
structural penetration (communications) will be deeper in the open peasant
economy but limited in complexity.
Estimates of linkage effects measure the impact of a particular activity
in terms of the forward, backward, and final demand linkages.

For the

principle primary commodities in Thailand, estimates made by Ayal are as
41
follows:
( a ) ~ : backward linkage was no more than 15 per cent of total rice
production; the additional external effects of expanding the market economy
through infrastructural development may have been considerable but cannot be
strictly measured.
20 per cent.

The forward linkage induced (chiefly rice milling) was

-19(b) ~ :

backward linkage close to zero; some forward linkages in the

:form of saw mills, furniture, and paper-making astablishments (employing a
total of 100, 000 pevple in 1960).

Since teak was the primary export yet

accounted for no more than a quarter of annual wood production the linkages
for that wood alone are unclear; final-demand linkage was small.
(c)

Rubber:

Small backward linkages, as even the communications

system existed before the plantations; forward linkages were also small since
the processing was restricted to smoking or crepping, and very little
domestic industry utilizing rubber was created; final demand linkages: a
rough idea is obtained by the total employment in rubber (150,000 in 1951).
(d) '.!'l:!!,:

Backward linkages were virtually zero and forward linkages

eat~emely small since nearly all the ore was exported to Malaya for smelting.

It should also be noted that non-dredging methods of production, requiring
very little fixed capital, continued to operate fairly extensively after the

introduction of (imported) dredging equipment.
The linkage effects into the economy from the primary production of these
four commodities from which Thailand derived historically between 70 to 90
per cent of her export value (from 1860-1950) were- thus very small,

The

staples theory is of some value in explaining the persistence of es.tablisbed
production functions in these primary commodity industries and thus the limited
structural change which occurred from the export of primary agricultural
commodities.
The historical determinants of underdevelopment can be further examined
in terms of the "tree-star" structures which emerged as a consequence of
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differential patterns of development.

In a broad overview of the economic

history of Europe, Fei and Ranis capture the nature of the transition from
pre-capitalist formations to industrialization in terms of the changing
relations of production. 42

Their analysis, like the analysis above, hinges

upon the dynamic effects of the expansion of commercial capital and trading
relations in a previously stagnant and largely self-sufficient economy. li 3
The importance of trade in their analysis rests on: (i) the impact
of the Smithian division of labor, made possible by greater exchange and
trade; (ii) changes in the method of organization to a task-specific division
of labor, individualistic capital accumulation and the increasing importance
of owners of mercantile capital as opposed to the landed aristocracy;
(iii) "learning by contact, " through an increased flow of good:::; .:ind ideas
and consequently broadening horizons; and (iv) the emergence of a national
economy, with greater physical and psychological unity.

In varying degrees

these factors describe aspects of the impact of trade on the 'I'hEJi economy.
In the "tree-star" structure in which Fei and Ranis represent the impact
of these forces, the stars represent a geographic area of agrarian activity
surrounded and linked by nucleur families, and the trees represent the
existence of an "interregional pattern of connectivity" of communications
and transport networks.

The tree-star structure thus corresponds to the

social infrastructure of interregional trade, the basis of which is the
extension of commercial capital.

In the transition from "agrarian feudalism"

to a higher phase of development which they call "mercantile agrarianism"
there are forces at work which expand the tree-star structure: increased

-21-

trade and the division of labor lever agricultural productivity which leads
in turn to the growth and spread of commercial capital.

This permits

eventually an even higher stage of development to be reached: "cumulative
ever-expanding forces inevitably propel the system towards transition to
full-fledged industrial capital-ism. ,,
By contrast,

4

£~

the pattern which emerged in the post-trade economy of

Thailand was one of a vast extension of commercial capital without increased
agricultural productivity; increased output was exogenously induced through
external demand, and was not

11

population pulled" or "agricultural productivity

pushed" along the lines of the Fei-Ranis model (for Europe).
The functional character of commercial capital covered the time necessary
for the transportation, storage and processing of agricultural commodities.
The tree-structure which developed in Thailand did not radiate in all directions
to form links between the stars, but was uni-directional-towards the port of
Bangkok.

As it did not link villages it discouraged interregional trade

and the local accumulation of capital for non-trade uses.

The strong tree

structure which emerged in the post-trade economy, it may be argued,
actually stunted the weak stars by eliminating existing rural industry artd

trade.
In the Fei-Ranis model the lack of development in export enclave economies
is accounted for by colonialism which prevented the development of trees
which would have li~ked already well developed village activity (such as in
India).

In contrast to the enclave economy, open peasant economies such as

Thailand saw the development of trees by a weakening, or lack of growth, in
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the stars.
To the tree-star concept must be added the underlying productive relations
which developed in the post-trade econom~ in particular those ensuing from
the Chinese control over commercial capital and their monopoly of internal
trade.

Commercial capital was used to widen the area of control over the

trading commodities and only invested in non-agricultural pursuits (such as
agricultural processing activities) to the degree that it enhanced control over
the disposition of the agricultural surplus.
The dynamic forces present in their model of the European experience
were absent - goods and ideas flowed along the trading channels of transport
and communication only insofar as it was necessary to facilitate the flow of
agricultural exports; there was no apparent relationship between investment
in commercial capital and labor productivity; alien insecurit~ concern for
profit remittances, and specialization of function in commerce and trading,
reduced drastically the rate of conversion of commercial capital into industrial
fixed capital.

The new mode of production consequent upon trade thus tended

to reinforce underdevelopment, and the transition from an economy in the phase
of mercantile capitalism to that of industrial capitalism was barely begun.
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v.

The Post-War Period:

Metropolis-Centered Development

It is not the purpose of this paper to give a complete description of
the post-war period, so this section will present a summary of the most important
changes and their relationship to the historical pattern which has been described.
In the post-war period Thailand has experienced rapid growth in national income yet remains "an extreme case of underdevelopment."

45

This period may be

described as underdevelopment in its metropolis-centered phase.
The structure which emerged at the end of the period 1855-1940 was one of
limited and highly particularized development, and it implied the entrenchment
of primary production.

The mode of operation of the economy remained based

on the agricultural surplus and predominantly mercantile capital in trading
and related activities.

Foreign factors had led to the creation of small mining

enclaves but there was very little development of manufacturing.

46

Agriculture consisted of a growing commercialized sector and a huge
stagnant hinterland.

Regional inequalitites grew: as the more distant regions

did not benefit from government infrastructural investment they became relatively
. 1 1nsta
.
b'1 li ty. 47
.
'
more b ac k war d an d an increasing
source o f po l '1 t1ca

operation of the economy is reflected in the distribution of income.

The mode of
The

gains in national income were not generally reflected in increases in rural
incomes, nor in the generation of employment in the rapidly growing advanced
sector centered around Bangkok.

Wealth has remained concentrated in the hands

of agricultural processors and exporterst an emerging bourgeosie in the metropolis,
and a ruling group who early on became involved in state enterprises and in
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a wide variety of business interests.

In contrast, levels of education,

health and welfare in the rural sector have remained extremely inadequate,
even by the government's own criteria.
48
. 1tura 1 sector remains
.
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80 per cent of the labor force, and is characterized by low levels of productiv49 h' h
.
· t e d d esp i tea no t·icea bl e ext ens i on o f cu lt'iva t·ion t o
ity.
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non-rice crops, especially maize, cassava, sorghum and beans.

50

In a general sense it is clear that the pattern of the post-trade economy
has constantly favored the metropolis at the expense of the agricultural
sector through the surplus-transference process.

The precise mechanics of

this process and how it has impwerished the agricultural sector are the
.
•
•
t.igation.
.
51
su b Ject
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Part of the answer appears to relate

to the imperfections of the distribution system in which middlemen, through
varying degrees of monopolistic and monoponistic powers, may both constrain
·
·
. 1 ch ange an d re duce t h e impact
·
tee h no 1ogica
o f pr i ce incentives.
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Reliance

upon the market is unlikely to ensure adequate development in dealing with
high distribution costs, hoarding and speculation by middlemen, the low levels
of income and high level of indebtedness of the Thai farmer.

Publically

owned cooperatives, credit, storage and marketing facilities which have been
sugges t ed to avoi'd t hestrange
1 h o ld of ex i sting
·

a·is t ri"b ution
·

53
system
mig
· ht

alleviate part of the problem, but its roots go back to historical detenninants
of the structure of the post-trade economy.
Other striking features of the problem of agricultural development are
the rapid population growth (3.2 per cent annually) which threatens to eliminate
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the rice surplus by 1975-80;

54

the export tax on rice which continues to

deny the rice farmer of between 30-40 per cent of the real value of his output;
and the growing divergence between non-agricultural and agricultural incomes.

55

There also appears to be some move away from peasant ownership towards tenant
· 56
· li stic.
. 1 ture b ecomes more capita
.
as agricu
f arming
The branch banking system, which has developed rapidly since 1930,

57

assists the surplus-transference process by siphoning off rural savings at the
branch level and remits them to Bangkok, for use in the metropolis.

Through

the widespread comprador system, interest rates are pushed above official levels;
only a very small part of bank business is related to loans or local development.
While the percentage of national income originating in non-agricultural
production has increased substantially since 1945, much of the growth has been
in social overhead, private construction and services, and has therefore
benefited the metropolis rather than the much larger hinterland.
There has been an impressive growth in the absolute size of the manufacturing
58
but it still has failed to provide for even the most basic needs of
sector
the country in consumption goods.

A large proportion of the manufacturing

growth is satellite to the service and construction sectors, or is engaged in
the assembly of wholly

imported machinery or automotive parts, or is in primary

processing of agricultural commodities.

Only ten per cent of the manufacturing

has had both high forward and backward linkages into the rest of the economy.

59

Thus manufacturing has not been very development oriented nor has it had
much effect on import substitution.

Yet it has also created an additional

problem in that the manufacturing sector has grown much faster than the rate of
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job creation.
1965

60

Thus Bangkok had levels of 4-. 5-5. 5% urban unemployment in

and underemployment is widespread (peddlars, servants, vendors, etc~.

Since 1965, growth in the metropolis had had the additional momentum of
a military-induced boom.

Hhile military spending probably accounted for about

half of the gains in gro·ss domestic product from 1965-67,

61

it has also led to

distortions in the pattern of resource allocation in the forms of additional
features: inflation, land speculation, construction (especially of luxury
hotels, western apartments, bars and massage parlours), conspicuous consump
tion, and growing inequalities of wealth.

All these have been encouraged by

the boom and have diverted resources further away from developmental uses.
The government's policy has been based on a firm endorsement of private
enterprise-free market development and it has done all it can to encourage
foreign investment through its pro-Western political stance, through the
investment promotion policy, guarantees against expropriation, and lack of
limitation on profit remittances.

Through the promotion policy hotels, pro

cessing, and assembly plants have enjoyed equal privileges (tariff protection,
special licenses, tax holidays, elimination of import duties on necessary in
puts) with more development-oriented investments such as chemicals, petroleum
and heavy industry.

62

The pattern of domestic investment has therefore not

reflected any strong priorities in the need for a manufacturing sector with
strong growth-promoting characteristics.
The dominance of mercantile capital and its lack of transfer to industrial
uses was explained by the high transfer cost; the merchant class in Thailand~
have not been primarily interested in production and found better opportunities
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for profit in land ownership, money lending, exporting and speculation.

63

The feasibility of domestic production of a wide range of consumer
goods depends on an expansion of the domestic market and therefore on a rise
in rural incomes.

Yet historically the internal market has tended to be an

appendage of the internal market of the advanced countries and imports have been
dominated by consumer goods while intermediate goods have accounted for a
small, although increasing, percentage of total imports,

64

In 1966, total

imports of textiles and textile products were larger than the export value of
all manufactured goods.

65

The concentration of wealth into the hands of a small group of traders,
industrialists and foreign factors in the metropolis does not provide a
distribution of income which would permit increased demand or investment for the
domestic market.

There appears to be concentration of wealth in a Thai-Chinese

beneficiary class which is in alliance with the ruling groups.

One aspect

of this is a pattern of Chinese-owned enterprises under the political patronage
of members of the bureaucracy,
interests of its own.

The same group also has extensive business

Members of the ruling political cliques appear to have

long been extensively involved in the private sector and in the nationalized
. d ustr i es. 66
in

What have been referred to as "deterrents"

67

against industrial investment -

namely the lack of a capital market, lack of bank credit, high risks,

lack of

managerial capacity, high liquidity preference (on the part of the Chinese) are
sympotomatic of the operating characteristics of the political economy and are
not, in themselves, amenable to direct policy solution.
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In the post-war period Thailand has enjoyed an almost consistent balance
of trade deficit,

From 1952-64, the exports of goods and services increased

60 per cent while receipts from foreign exchange increased by 130 per cent,
Only 85 per cent of the foreign exchange was actually paid for in exports, the
difference being accounted for by international loans and foreign aid.

68

Foreign reserves have not only been the basis of an apparently stable
situation but also have brought the country increasingly into the complex
interaction of the international banking system, private investment, military
spending and foreign aid,

These together reinforce the need to maintain tra

ditional primary exports to pay for the loans and needed capital, and add a
further element of rigidity to the development policy.

In the place of British

dominance, Thailand has become increasingly dependent upon the United States and
Japan (its major trading partner).

This reliance, both economic and political,

is a major element in its future stability.

In summary, the current operation of the political economy appears inimical
in many ways to a development policy which would be growth-generating and which
would diffuse the gains from growth to alleviate poverty and backwardness.

The

underlying historical structure has changed very little in spite of the synthetic
appearence of a metropolis-centered pattern of growth.

Barriers to change, in

this historical perspective, are more profound than simple adjustments in policy;
they lie in the character of the political economy, the mode of surplus appropria
tion, and the structure of underdevelopment,

While the problems and contradictions

- I
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of domestic development have increased, particularly in the last 15 years, at
the same time

the policy choices have diminished, and those currently avail

able appear increasingly inadequate for dealing with the problems at hand.
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